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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY & J 
LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY, : 
Plaintiff and s 
Respondent, : 
V * J 
NEAL W. FINLAYSON, individually : 
and LEE CHILDS, individually ; 
and as Guardian ad litem of \ 
MICHELLE CHILDS, a minor, s 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
\ No. 860204 - CA 
: Before Judges Orme, 
: Bench and Billings 
METROPOLITAN PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County 
the Honorable David B. Dee, District Judge, Presiding 
LOWELL V. SMITH, ESQ. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Metropolitan 
Property & Liability 
Insurance Company 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 363-7611 
ANTHONY M. THURBER, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
Childs 
Suite 735 Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 533-0181 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY & : 
LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY, : 
Plaintiff and : 
Respondent, i 
V. ! 
NEAL W. FINLAYSON, individually : 
and LEE CHILDSf individually 
and as Guardian ad litem of 
MICHELLE CHILDS, a minor, 
: PETITION FOR REHEARING 
: No. 860204 - CA 
: 
Defendant and : 
Appellant. : 
COMES NOW Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance 
Company, by and through its attorneys undersigned and, pursuant 
to Rule 35, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, moves this court 
for rehearing. 
This Petition for Rehearing is supported by the attached 
memorandum of points of law and fact which petitioner claims the 
court has overlooked or misapprehended. 
The undersigned counsel for petitioner hereby certifies 
that the petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
DATED this 3LM" day of March, 1988. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
V. SMITH 
Attorneys for Metropolitan 
Property & Liability Insurance 
Company 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
The following Memorandum of Points and Authorities is 
submitted in support of Metropolitan Property & Liability 
Insurance Company's Petition for Rehearing. 
ISSUES FOR RECONSIDERATION 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court of Appeals 
has overlooked or misapprehended a number of issues critical to 
the appeal in this matter. The following list will itemize some 
of the concerns of Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance 
Company. Each issue will be discussed in greater depth in the 
body of the memorandum. 
1. THE ISSUES PRESENTED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
CONSIDERATION WERE MANY. 
This Court of Appeals indicated that: 
The single issue on appeal is whether the 
trial court correctly determined, on the 
stipulated facts, that Finlayson's use of the 
FINCO pickup constituted "regular use" within 
the meaning of the exclusion contained in the 
policy. If it did, the pickup would not be 
considered a non-owned automobile for the 
purposes of the policy and Metropolitan would 
have no liability. (Opinion page 2). 
The issue of whether the actual use of the pickup truck 
at the time of the accident was a "regular use" was one issue, 
but only one. Metropolitan pointed out in its brief that actual 
use was not required to invoke the exclusion. Rather, if the 
pickup truck was furnished or available for regular use, the 
exclusion would be invoked to exclude coverage. 
There were a multitude of other issues raised by the 
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i 
The policy of insurance, as discussed in the briefs 
filed with this Court, provides that there is no coverage for a 
non-owned vehicle which is "furnished or available for the 
regular use of either the named insured or any relative." 
Applying this Court's adopted definition of "pattern of use" to 
the term "regular use" it is clear that the pickup truck was 
"furnished for or available for" the "pattern or prescribed 
course of use" which would exclude coverage. 
4. THE POLICY ITSELF INCORPORATES A "FREQUENCY" TEST, 
RATHER THAN A "PATTERN OF USE" TEST. Further, the policy focuses 
on the vehicle, not the driver. 
The exclusion under consideration by this Court of 
Appeals distinguishes between a "temporary substitute automobile" 
and an automobile furnished or available for the regular use of 
the insured. 
5. THE PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND THE EXCLUSION IS NOT 
FOSTERED BY THE ADOPTION OF A "PATTERN OF USE" TEST. 
Metropolitan indicated to this Court that the purpose 
behind the "drive other cars" exclusion is to encourage (in this 
case) an employer to supply sufficient liability insurance on a 
company truck being operated by an employee to protect the public 
and his employees. Further, if an individual desires to have 
additional, private protection for his operation of the vehicle, 
he need only list the vehicle on his individual policy and pay a 
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premium for such coverage. The Court's opinion wouldf in effect, 
send a signal to employers that they need not have sufficient 
insurance (since the individual's private policy will supply 
additional insurance coverage) and sends a signal to the 
individual that he need not pay for insurance coverage on 
vehicles he frequently uses but does not own. 
6. THIS COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE EXCLUSION, RAISED 
BY METROPOLITAN IN ITS BRIEF AND IN ORAL ARGUMENT, WHICH EXCLUDED 
A "BUSINESS USE" EXCLUSION. 
The Metropolitan policy excluded coverage (in addition 
to the "regular use" exclusion) to vehicles: 
. . . while maintained or used by any person 
while such person is employed or otherwise 
engaged in any other business or occupation. . 
. 
This Court of Appeals did not discuss the fact that Mr. 
Finlayson's use of the truck to take him to and from work each 
day was considered by his employer to be part of his business use 
of the truck and was part of the normal operation of the truck. 
Further, this Court did not discuss the fact that the employer's 
business automobile insurance policy has already acknowledged the 
injuries sustained were a business-related accident, and has paid 
a substantial amount of money for the damages arising from this 
accident. 
DISCUSSION 
POINT I; THE ISSUES PRESENTED TO THIS COURT OF APPEALS 
WERE MANY. 
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The issues presented to this Court of Appeals were many 
and were complex. The Court, in addressing the issues before it, 
stated: 
The single issue on appeal is whether the 
trial court correctly determined, on the 
stipulated facts, that Finalyson's use of the 
FINCO pickup constituted "regular use" within 
the meaning of the policy. If it did, the 
pickup would not be considered a "non-owned 
automobile" for the purposes of the policy and 
Metropolitan would have no liability. 
(Opinion p. 2). 
The issue of the use of the pickup truck by Neal 
Finlayson was an important issue to this appeal, but was only one 
issue. As Metropolitan pointed out in its brief and at oral 
argument, the policy excluded coverage to vehicles which were 
owned by the insured (but not scheduled on the policy), and to 
non-owned vehicles which were furnished or available for the 
regular use of the insured, Mr. Finlayson. 
The Court did consider the fact that the 
truck was furnished to Neal Finlayson for use 
in the course of his employment, i.e., 
answering calls for and performing mechanical 
repairs, his use of the truck to go to and 
from the "Animal House" bar was outside that 
course, especially in view of the limitations 
expressly put on his use of the truck by 
FINCO." (Opinion at p. 3). 
However, the Court did not consider nor address the fact 
that the truck was available for such use. The Court's attention 
was focused on the actual use to which the vehicle had been put; 
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not to the potential use for which the employer had made the 
truck available. 
This distinction is important. As a practical matter 
using appellant's suggested definition of "regular use," any use 
of a non-owned vehicle may be deemed to be "irregular" when an 
accident occurs. The "pattern of use" did not establish that 
accidents would regularly occur, that vehicles would be used by 
individuals had been drinking, that, etc. However, the policy 
doesn't require only that there be a deviation of actual use in 
order to establish an "irregular" use. Rather, the policy only 
requires that the vehicle be available for regular use. It may 
be that a particular vehicle will have never been "regularly 
used." However, if the potential for regular use exists (i.e., 
it is "available" for regular use), the insured must pay a 
premium for coverage or the coverage will be excluded. 
Further, the use to which the truck was being put at the 
time of the accident was the same as it had been used on numerous 
other occasions; i.e., taking Mr. Finlayson home. Mr. 
Finlayson's capacity may have been diminished because of his 
consumption of alcohol, but the use of the truck remained 
unaltered. The policy exclusion for uses on the potential use of 
the truck, not the "state" of the operator. 
There were a number of other issues, raised by the 
parties to the appeal, which were not considered by this Court. 
The Court did not address whether Mr. Finlayson's use of the 
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pickup truck was a "business use" as excluded in the policy. 
The Court did not address what the effect should be, 
given its finding of an ambiguity in the meaning of the term 
"regular use" as applied against the language of the policy. 
The Court did not address the public policy supporting 
the "drive other cars" exclusion. 
The Court did not address the fact that Mr. Finlayson's 
business automobile policy had already acknowledged the accident 
to be one covered by its insurance policy. 
The Court did not address the internal language of the 
exclusion which supports Metropolitan's contention of no 
ambiguity. 
The point is, there are a number of other issues beyond 
simply the issue of whether "Finlayson's use of the FINCO pickup 
constituted 'regular use' within the meaning of the policy." 
This Court should grant the Petition for Rehearing so that each 
of the issues raised can be adequately considered by this Court. 
POINT II; FINDING OF AN AMBIGUITY DOES NOT RESULT, A 
FORTIORI, IN COVERAGE. 
This Court found that, since the term "regular use" is 
ambiguous (because various courts from other jurisdictions have 
reached different interpretations of the term) "the phrase must, 
therefore, be construed in favor of coverage for Neal Finlayson 
and, therefore, recovery for appellant Childs." The Court's 
holding is not supported by the premise. 
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This Courtf citing Sears v. Riemersmaf Utah 655 P.2d 
1105 (1982) stated that an ambiguity resulting from a failure to 
define a term in a contract should "trigger the doctrine that 
ambiguous language in a contract will be strictly construed 
against the party who drafted the provision. (Opinion p. 5) . 
With this general proposition/ Metropolitan does not disagree. 
Howeverf the mere finding of an ambiguity does not operate in a 
dispositive fashion simply because ambiguity has been found. 
This Court has cited its own opinion Wilburn v. 
Interstate Electric/ C.A. Utah/ 74 Utah Adv.Rep 23 (1988) as 
standing for the proposition that: 
Ordinarily/ it is appropriate to simply 
construe ambiguities against insurers/ without 
pausing to consider extrinsic evidence as to 
intent/ since the parties to routine kinds of 
insurance contracts typically do not discuss 
or negotiate terms, and provisions. (Opinion/ 
p. 3/ footnote 3) . 
It should be pointed out that insurance contract forms are not 
unilaterally drafted by insurance companies and imposed upon an 
unsuspecting public. Under current lawf the insurance industry 
is substantially regulated as to the kinds of insurance which may 
be written/ the specific provisions which may be contained in 
insurance policies/ specific provisions which may not be 
contained in insurance policies/ etc. Utah Code Annotated 
Section 31A-21-201/ et seq.f provides that insurance policies 
must be filed with tHe Commissioner of Insurance who may 
disapprove a form for a number of reasons. Specific requirements 
for the content and language of insurance policy are also set 
forth in detail in many of the Sections of the Insurance Code. 
Seef for example. Section 31A-21-301/ et seq. and Chapter 22 , 
Contracts in Specific Lines. The definition of a non-owned 
vehicle is a definition typically used in insurance policies/ 
the form of which has been filed with the insurance department. 
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Even in cases involving insurance policies, it is not 
dispositive to merely find an ambiguity in an insurance contract. 
Even though extrinsic evidence may not be helpful in resolving 
questions of "intent and meaning" since no "negotiation nor 
discussion may have taken place," further inquiry is still 
required to determine what effect a particular definition may 
have on the extent of the exclusion. 
Here, for example, the validity of the exclusion was not 
questioned. Rather, appellant's attack was focused on the 
alleged ambiguity of the exclusion. Appellant contended that the 
term "regular use" must be interpreted to show a "pattern of use" 
consistent with a prescribed course of conduct or dealing to 
which the truck had been put in the past. 
Assuming that an ambiguity exists, which the Court 
found, the Court should then determine what effect the exclusion 
would have when applying the definition of "regular use" as 
proposed by appellant. Merely finding that an ambiguity exists 
does not result in dispositive fashion to resolve the matter 
against an insurer. 
POINT III: APPLYING A "PATTERN OF USAGE" MEANING TO THE 
TERM "REGULAR USE" DOES NOT ESTABLISH COVERAGE. 
As Metropolitan pointed out in its brief and at hearing, 
the Metropolitan policy states: 
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non-owned automobile" means an automobile 
which is neither owned by nor furnished nor 
available for the regular use of either the 
named insured or any relative, other than a 
temporary substitute automobile and includes a 
utility trailer while used with such 
automobile. 
Since the Court found that the term "regular use" is 
ambiguous, it should apply the meaning proposed by appellant to 
the term and then analyze the exclusion in light of the then 
established meaning* Therefore, the exclusion as defined by 
appellant, would read: 
"Non-owned automobile" means an automobile 
which is neither owned by nor furnished nor 
available for the "pattern or prescribed 
course of conduct" (i.e., employment use, 
answering calls for and performing mechanical 
repairs; see Opinion p. 3) of the named 
insured . . . 
The exclusion does not pertain to a particular use at a 
particular time. Rather, the truck cannot be "furnished for" or 
"available for" the "employment use, general course of conduct or 
dealing," for which the truck had been used or available. If it 
is, furnished or available for such use, coverage is excluded. 
The issue, using the court's adopted definition becomes, 
was the truck furnished for the employment use; i.e., "answering 
calls for and performing mechanical repairs" (Opinion p. 3) as 
the regular use of the truck? This Court found (by adopting 
appellant's proposed definition) that it was. Was the use of the 
truck after having left the Animal House contrary to this use? 
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Again, the Court apparently found that it was. (Opinion, p. 3). 
However, was the pickup furnished for or available for the 
"regular use" of Mr. Finlayson. Certainly, since the standard 
which the Court adopted for the definition of the term "regular 
use" was the use to which the truck was typically used, the truck 
was available for regular use. 
The particular use at a particular time may not have 
constituted "regular use" (using appellant's and this Court's 
definition) but the pickup truck was obviously furnished for or 
available for such use. 
This approach is consistent with the cases cited by the 
Court in reaching its decision. In Central Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. 
v.DePinto, Kansas 681 P.2d 15 (1984), as cited by the Court, the 
Kansas Supreme Court said: 
The test whether an automobile is furnished 
for "regular use" within an exclusionary 
clause is not necessarily the frequency or 
regularity of its, although an infrequent and 
casual use by special permission on particular 
occasions may not constitute a furnishing for 
regular use. It is the nature of the use for 
which the vehicle is intended and to which it 
is put, rather than the actual duration of 
use, wHich is significant^ (Emphasis Added). 
Applying appellant's and the Court's definition of 
"regular use" and applying such definition to the facts of this 
Again, the use of the pickup truck at the time of the accident 
was the same use to which the truck had been put on a number of 
occasions; taking Mr. Finlayson home. His capacity to perform 
the function was impaired, but the use was the same. 
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accident, the exclusion would still exclude coverage for the 
accident. 
POINT IV: THE POLICY ITSELF ESTABLISHES A FREQUENCY 
TEST. 
The "regular use" exclusion which is the subject of this 
appeal establishes a "frequency test." As mentioned above, the 
exclusion distinguishes between a "temporary substitute 
automobile" and an automobile which is furnished or available for 
the regular use of the named insured. The exclusion states: 
"Non-owned automobile" means an automobile 
which is neither owned by nor furnished nor 
available for the regular use of either the 
named insured or any relative, other than a 
temporary substitute automobile. . . 
The policy exclusion itself, then establishes a 
"frequency" standard. That is, a "temporary" versus "regular" 
standard is invoked to determine whether a vehicle is a non-owned 
vehicle. If temporary, the vehicle is a non-owned vehicle. If 
not temporary, the vehicle is a "regular" (i.e., regularly used) 
vehicle. 
The exclusion of the policy focuses on the vehicle 
rather than the driver. That is, if the automobile is a 
"temporary substitute vehicle" (whether actually used or not), it 
is covered by the non-owned definition in the policy. If the 
vehicle is furnished for or available for the regular use of the 
insured (whether actually used or not) it is not a non-owned 
automobile as defined in the policy. Here, the truck was used 
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daily, was stored at Mr. Finlayson's house in the evening (even 
though other company trucks were stored at the company lot), Mr. 
Finlayson had keys to the truck and Mr. Finlayson was the primary 
operator of the truck. The focus of this court's inquiry should 
not be on how the truck was actually usedf but the availability 
of the truck for use by Mr. Finlayson. 
POINT V: THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE POLICY BEHIND 
THE "DRIVE OTHER CARS" PROVISION. 
As pointed out in its brief, the purpose of the 
provision extending coverage to certain non-owned vehicles, is to 
provide covercige to an insured while temporarily operating a 
non-owned vehicle as a temporary substitute automobile. 
In cases involving company vehicles, this policy 
encourages employers who allow employees to use company vehicles 
to maintain adequate insurance on the company vehicles as a 
benefit to the employee and as a protection to the public. In 
this case, insurance was maintained by FINCO on the pickup truck 
being used by Mr. Finlayson. The automobile policy on the 
company truck has already paid almost two hundred thousand 
dollars in claims arising from this accident. 
However, if an employee uses a truck on a regular basis 
as more than a temporary substitute vehicle and is concerned 
about the limits of insurance being maintained by his company, or 
is concerned that his company may disclaim any responsibility for 
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his acts, he may obtain his own coverage by simply listing the 
truck on his policy and paying a premium for such coverage. 
Here, Mr. Finlayson only listed the Chevrolet Monte Carlo on the 
insurance policy with Metropolitan. He did not ask for, nor did 
he pay a premium for, insurance on the pickup truck. Yet, this 
truck was used by Mr. Finlayson as the primary operator. Since 
he used it every day in his work, used it to go to and from work, 
used it some evenings, and used it on some occasions for personal 
errands, he used the truck more than any other vehicle he 
operated. The truck was actually used, and available for, use 
beyond a temporary substitute vehicle. 
Sound public policy supports a finding that only the 
FINCO business automobile policy would apply to the accident. 
POINT VI; THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE BUSINESS USE 
EXCLUSION. 
As mentioned in Metropolitan's brief, the policy of 
insurance excluded coverage to: 
. . . a non-owned automobile while maintained 
or used by any person while such person is 
employed or otherwise engaged in any other 
business or occupation. . . 
Neal's employer considered his use of the truck to take 
him to his job and back home from the job to be part of the 
authorized business use. (See Stipulated Facts, #19). At the 
time of the accident, Neal Finlayson was on his way home. 
(Stipulated Facts, #26). The 1978 Chevrolet pickup truck was 
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stored at Neal Finlayson's home in the evenings, although other 
company trucks were stored at the company lot when not in use, 
(Stipulated Facts, #17). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and each of them, it is 
respectfully submitted that this Court of Appeals should grant 
Petitioner's Motion for Rehearing in order to fully consider the 
facts, issues and law applicable to this case. 
DATED this £X*f day of March, 1988. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
7ELL V. SMITH 
Attorneys for Metropolitan 
Property & Liability 
Insurance Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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prepaid, on this cPjL day of March, 1988, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Anthony M. Thurber 
Suite 735 Judge Buildng 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake Cityf UT 84111 
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants 
John M. Chipman 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake Cityf UT 84101 
Attorney for Neal Finlayson (not a 
party in the appeal) 
Lynn J. Clark 
935 East 7220 South, Suite D-108 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Attorney for Mike Barton (not a party 
in the appeal) 
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